Full digital citizenship presupposes effective computer literacy, i.e. a skilful use of technologies, as well as the possession of material resources and a technical and human capital capable of accessing and actively participating in political life through digital platforms. For these reasons, it is necessary to guarantee equal pre-conditions of accessibility to the Internet and to enjoy complete, impartial and neutral information.

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Access to the Internet, developing a daily, virtual and online participation, besides allowing a fast flow of information, constitutes a new legal paradigm of the right to inform, to be informed and to be informed, as well as a modern opportunity to express one's ideas not only through the traditional - constitutionally guaranteed - means of expressing one's opinions.  Information and accessibility to political, social, economic and cultural pluralism, as enhanced by today's techniques of mass communication, provide an opportunity to nourish a given order with democracy, measuring its level of openness and involvement and contributing to placing the citizen as such at the centre of public dynamics.

 

It is obvious at this point, however, to note a considerable disparity between those who have more or less access to e-democracy platforms: for example, between young and old, rich and poor countries, between educated and uneducated, between political activists and more. Digital inequality based on all these components leads to the fragmentation of societies and to the inevitable creation of a gap that leads to social and political hierarchisation of an electronic nature, resulting in undoubted discrimination and new and modern forms of inequality.

 

A low and inadequate level of participation causes the general interest to be neglected in favour of the particular one, since decisions would be taken only by that part of the population capable of using information technology. In addition to this, further problems arise when accessing IT platforms and network control over the data and information that can and must circulate becomes necessary.

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There is the possibility, unfortunately, on the part of digital controllers, to disseminate only a particular type of information, not necessarily truthful, thereby conditioning the virtual citizen. A lack of computer literacy and the difficulty of verifying the truthfulness, correctness, completeness and neutrality of information leads to its manipulation, constructing a distortion of reality that becomes superficial and self-referential to such an extent as to preclude the formation of a mass digitised community that is effectively aware and critical.

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These complications become even more evident when digital citizens are called upon to express their preference on political issues. They would, even if explicitly consulted, provide personal indications that could hardly adequately consider the criteria for the overall optimisation of the common good as a result of particular technical choices. Leaving this phase of decision-making directly in the hands of the citizens would constitute a risk, which would be further aggravated by the possibility of de facto ousting the 'digital illiterates', i.e. those people who have no computer skills whatsoever. For this hypothesis, the risk could be that of a predetermination of the questions and answers congenial to those who formulated them, with a consequent restriction of the faculty of choice limited to a 'yes' or 'no'.

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The approach to support the activity of the policy-maker, i.e. to indicate operational choices, then requires extremely careful and sophisticated management of the results, capable of allowing a reading unaffected by statistical distortions. Moreover, if this tool were to be used for topics requiring highly specialised and evolved technical expertise, it could provide results without real meaning.

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Political participation, in this way, becomes artificial since it resolves itself into a mere ratification of pre-packaged options, without any minimum opportunity for discussion and confrontation.[50] Supporters of e-democracy believe that electronic procedures would speed up the entire electoral process by favouring a rapid and real-time counting of votes by exploiting the most modern and efficient technologies. They would thus increase voter participation by giving more voters the opportunity to cast their votes because of the assumed ease of using computer equipment.

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Electronic voting would be expressed either from home computers or in manned public polling stations where the secrecy and personality of the suffrage would in any case be ensured by the identification of the voter by means of a pin, password or smart card, thus further expressing the democratic character of a state and a new mode of political participation. It must be borne in mind, however, that the importance of the right to vote, both in terms of its value and its historical-legal significance, cannot be totally entrusted to electronic devices that are liable to pollute the electoral competition without having the certainty of ensuring the most scrupulous respect for constitutional guarantees. The critical nature of this type of voting, in fact, is to be found in the resulting electronic equipment subject to the possible alteration of the electoral competition and, consequently, the lack of absolute protection of respect for constitutional guarantees.

 

Starting from this assumption, therefore, it can be deduced that home voting also presents serious criticalities inasmuch as not only would it not allow full identification of the voter in the freedom to vote, but it would also fail to ensure secrecy. There would also be a lack of certainty as to the concrete transparency of suffrage, its registration and its actual manifestation, since, as already mentioned above, one can never be certain of the proper functioning of hardware and software, just as one cannot exclude the possibility of hacking and manipulating the vote. The possible exclusion of those who do not have a high level of computer and technological education would also weigh heavily, both because they belong to distant generations and because of the difficulty of understanding the world of the net. Home voting, among other things, is, according to many, to be ruled out because of the possible use of devices that are used daily for other purposes, and this would conflict with the public function that only the presence at the polling station of the individual renders fully the character of a public subject".

 

An intrinsic weakness of such a system, in fact, is precisely the use of the voters' personal computers. The voter's terminal (client) is in fact one of the biggest problems in terms of security, as it is often inadequately protected against the most common cyber threats. Consider that in 2014, it was estimated that around a third of computers worldwide would be infected with malware, giving unauthorised parties the ability to spy on the voter, or even vote for them.  Despite the potential benefits offered by online voting, therefore, including the possibility of increasing voter turnout, decreasing costs and improving accessibility of voting, progress in its implementation has so far been rather slow due to its vulnerabilities which also insist on the client/server system, the underlying structure of an internet voting solution.

 

In addition, it is now generally agreed that 'the human factor is always the weakest link in cybersecurity'. Voters need to be aware of the security threats to their device, hence, access to a secure and reliable device is the only credible option for certain results from elections held with i-voting systems.[59]

Taking into consideration the server through which the voting service is offered, it is useful, in fact, to remember that an i-voting system can be subject to cyber attacks that can employ the most disparate methods.